meta-rationality is worth distinguishing from rationality
- status: half-braindump
- broadly a bunch of my perspective on this includes:
- that there seem to be a bunch of classic rationalist errors
- which are held in common between bayesian rationality and critical rationality and some less-explicitly rationalist schools
- that while lesswrong necessarily incorporates a lot of what would be called "meta-rationality", it still promotes way of thinking that make these errors
- one possibly would be referring to those errors as rationalisms, rather than rationality
- I commented in relation to David Deutsch's critical rationalism vs
- I have a maybe-to-be-published dialogue with Kaj Sotala about this
- Relevant tweets etc
2 linked references
March 22nd, 2021
- I read some chunks of this huge mess of an exchange between David Chapman and Eliezer Yudkowsky on twitter, which is largely visible scrolling up from here:
- and at one point Eliezer Yudkowsky questions David Chapman's claim that people think bayes rules is central to probability, and some guy brilliantly manages to find this tweet from EY himself just 6 weeks prior saying:
- this is him utterly equating the two, as far as I can tell! (and, what's more, kind of implying that others are embarrassingly naive for not realizing they're the same)
- Nate Soares seems the most able to actually bridge the conversation and seriously try to figure out where they're talking past each other
- summary from Nate of next steps plausibly worth taking if the motivation existed which it does not appear to
- a tweet of mine that's relevant here, specifically about Bayes Theorem